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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2827 
________________ 
 
 
SCOTT D. MICHALESKO, 
                         Appellant 
  
v. 
  
FREELAND BOROUGH; ROBERT J. QUINN; 
JOHN BUDDA; JOHN POTOSKIE; BARBARA TULANOWSKI; 
RICK WENNER; JOSEPH PALKO, JR.; DANIEL BOBBY 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-02634) 
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 16, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, NYGAARD, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 15, 2016) 
                                              
 The Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen participated in the decision in this case, but 
died before the opinion could be filed.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46 and Third Circuit I.O.P. 12.1(b). 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiff Scott Michalesko appeals the dismissal of his due process, First 
Amendment, and disability discrimination claims against Freeland Borough and its 
Council members.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.   
I.  
 Michalesko was a police officer with the Freeland Borough Police Department 
when the Borough’s Council terminated his employment for conduct unbecoming an 
officer.  Michalesko appealed the decision to binding arbitration, and the arbitrator 
ordered reinstatement with back pay.  During this period, the Department and the Council 
were negotiating a new employment contract, and Michalesko was a representative for 
the Department’s union.   
 Michalesko sued the Freeland Borough and the Council members for violations of 
his due process right to a pre-suspension hearing, for violations of his First Amendment 
rights, and for disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 
43 Pa. Const. Stat. § 955.  On a motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the 
disability claim and allowed the others to proceed.  At summary judgment, the District 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Court entered judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claims.  This appeal 
followed.   
II.1 
  Michalesko first argues that the District Court should have let his disability 
discrimination claim proceed past the motion to dismiss.  In his complaint, Michalesko 
alleged that the Council members terminated his employment because they thought he 
suffered from an “alleged mental infirmity” related to an “acute stress reaction with 
anxiety distress” he experienced on December 22, 2011.2  We agree with the District 
Court that these allegations were insufficient to state a plausible perceived disability 
claim under the ADA and the PHRA, which are generally interpreted identically.  See 
Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).  Employees cannot bring such a 
claim when the alleged impairment is “transitory and minor,” defined by the ADA as “an 
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”  42 U.S.C. § 
12102(3)(B).  “[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the impairment that the employer 
perceived is an impairment that is objectively transitory and minor.”  Budhun v. Reading 
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
decisions granting the motion to dismiss in part and granting summary judgment is 
plenary, and we apply the same standards as the District Court.  Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., 
LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013); Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 
770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 
2 Though not mentioned in the complaint, the summary judgment record clarified that 
Michalesko may have tried to commit suicide on December 22, 2011 after receiving a 
letter informing him of pending disciplinary charges.  On that day, Michalesko’s daughter 
found him in the basement of his home with a gun in his hand.  His wife called a friend, 
who called 911 and reported that Michalesko had put the gun to his head and had 
threatened to commit suicide in front of his family.   
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Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014).  We conclude that any perceived 
impairment related to Michalesko’s single acute stress reaction would have been 
objectively transitory and minor, and the District Court thus did not err in dismissing the 
disability claim. 
 Michalesko next argues that the District Court improperly entered summary 
judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim, where he alleged that the Council 
members fired him in retaliation for his union activities.  We conclude that, assuming he 
had engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, Michalesko failed to present 
sufficient evidence that the protected activity caused his termination.  See Lauren W. ex 
rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (outlining elements of 
retaliation claim).  To establish a causal connection, Michalesko could have produced 
evidence of an “unusually suggestive” proximity in time “between the protected activity 
and the alleged retaliatory action or “a pattern of antagonism coupled with [close] 
timing.”  Id.  At summary judgment, he was unable to produce either type of evidence.  
As the District Court explained, three to four months had elapsed between the protected 
activity and the first alleged adverse action, and there was no evidence of a pattern of 
hostility.   
Finally, Michalesko argues that his procedural due process claim should have 
survived summary judgment.  We disagree.  “[U]nder Pennsylvania law, a policeman’s 
property interest in his job is protected from either termination or suspension . . . and due 
process therefore entitles him to a pre-suspension or pre-termination hearing—albeit a 
brief and informal one.”  Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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Michalesko alleged that he was denied a pre-suspension hearing, but this allegation was 
not borne out by the record at summary judgment.  It is undisputed that the Council 
notified Michalesko in a December 21, 2011 letter that a hearing was scheduled for 
December 31 to address, among other things, pending disciplinary charges.  It is further 
undisputed that he decided not to attend the hearing and, on January 3, 2012, the Council 
suspended him without pay.  Michalesko responds that he was suspended because of the 
alleged suicide attempt on December 22 and that he was never given a pre-suspension 
hearing to address the events of that day.  But the suspension letter made clear that the 
suspension was “a result of the allegations” contained in the December 21 letter and 
“pending further hearing” on the events of December 22.  Accordingly, Michalesko 
received sufficient pre-suspension process, and the District Court was right to enter 
summary judgment on this claim.   
*    *     *     *     * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s rulings granting the 
motion to dismiss in part and granting the motion for summary judgment.    
 
